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Can competing manufacturers obtain higher pro￿ts by delegating retail decisions to independent
agents, rather than selling directly to ￿nal consumers? Manufacturers jointly bene￿t from
high retail prices but, when they sell directly to ￿nal consumers, competition among them
results in low prices and pro￿ts. However, a manufacturer can induce an independent retailer
to sell at higher prices, by charging a wholesale price higher than marginal cost. And credibly
committing to doing so has a ￿ strategic e⁄ect￿on rival retailers, who react by selling at higher
prices themselves, thus reducing downstream competition. (See, e.g., Bonanno and Vickers,
1988, Vickers, 1995, and Rey and Stiglitz, 1987.)
This insight hinges on the assumption that contracts between manufacturers and retailers
are observed by competitors (i.e., public): when contracts are private (or, alternatively, when
publicly announced contracts can be secretly renegotiated), a manufacturer￿ s wholesale price
cannot a⁄ect the strategy of a rival retailer. Therefore, it is often argued that delegation has no
strategic e⁄ect because manufacturers always charge a wholesale price equal to marginal cost ￿
a neutrality result (see, e.g., Coughlan and Wernerfelt, 1989, and Katz, 1991).
We show that the neutrality result rests on a speci￿c assumption about retailers￿conjectures
on their competitors￿contracts ￿ i.e., passive beliefs ￿ and that the equilibrium changes when
alternative, but equally reasonable, assumptions are considered. The point is that, with private
contracts, a retailer￿ s strategy depends on his conjecture about the wholesale price paid by rival
retailers, and this conjecture may depend on the contract o⁄ered to the retailer. Hence, even
if vertical separation cannot directly a⁄ect the strategies of rival retailers, it can still a⁄ect a
retailer￿ s conjecture about his rivals￿input cost (as well as the retailer￿ s own input cost).
If retailers conjecture that identical manufacturers always choose the same wholesale price
(symmetry beliefs), vertical separation by all manufacturers arises in equilibrium, and yields
higher manufacturers￿pro￿ts. Hence, even when contracts with retailers cannot be observed by
outsiders, vertical separation can reduce competition by inducing less aggressive behavior by
retailers in the ￿nal market.
In models with a single principal and multiple agents, the typical assumption is that agents
have passive beliefs (e.g., Cremer and Riordan, 1987, Horn and Wolinsky, 1988, Hart and Tirole,
1990, La⁄ont and Martimort, 2000, Martimort, 1996, and O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er, 1992). In con-
trast to a situation with symmetry beliefs, a retailer who has passive beliefs and receives an o⁄er
di⁄erent from the one he expects in equilibrium does not revise his beliefs about the o⁄ers made
to rival retailers. In this case, vertical separation a⁄ects neither the strategies of rival retailers,
nor a retailer￿ s conjectures about these strategies. Hence, vertically separated manufacturers
act as if they were integrated with their retailers and always charge a wholesale price equal to
marginal cost.
When there are competing manufacturers, however, the assumption of passive beliefs is not
necessarily the most natural one. If a manufacturer has an incentive to o⁄er a contract di⁄erent
2from the one that the retailer expects, then why should another identical manufacturer not
have an incentive to do the same? Arguably, it is reasonable to assume that retailers perceive
deviations as symmetric, and conjecture that identical manufacturers always o⁄er the same
contract. An alternative interpretation of symmetry beliefs is that retailers are naive, or have
￿ bounded rationality,￿and simply believe that the strategy adopted by a rival manufacturer is
always identical to the strategy adopted by the manufacturer with whom they are contracting.1
Or retailers may be completely uninformed about some private, and common, characteristic of
manufacturers ￿ e.g., the manufacturers￿production cost ￿ and so be unable to determine the
manufacturers￿equilibrium contract.2
Hart and Tirole (1990) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994) consider symmetry beliefs in a
model with a single (monopolistic) manufacturer and two independent and competing retailers.
They show that, with private contracts, the manufacturer￿ s pro￿t depends on retailers￿beliefs
and is higher with symmetry than with passive beliefs.3 However, they also argue that the
assumption of passive beliefs is the most natural one in their model, because if the manufacturer
o⁄ers a contract di⁄erent from the equilibrium one to a retailer, she has no incentive to o⁄er the
same contract to the other retailer. By contrast, we believe that symmetry beliefs are especially
appealing with identical competing vertical chains, because if one of the manufacturers has an
incentive to o⁄er a contract di⁄erent from the equilibrium one, then a rival manufacturer should
have an incentive to do the same. So it is natural for a retailer who receives an unexpected o⁄ers
to conjecture that the same reason that induced his manufacturer to deviate also induced rival
manufacturers to make an identical deviation.
To explore the e⁄ects of beliefs, we analyze a delegation game with unobservable contracts.
First manufacturers publicly choose whether to sell through independent retailers or not. Second,
vertically separated manufacturers o⁄er two-part tari⁄s to retailers. Finally, price competition
takes place in the retail market. We compare equilibria with passive and symmetry beliefs.
In contrast to the neutrality result with passive beliefs, with symmetry beliefs delegation is
a weakly dominant strategy. Speci￿cally, there are two equilibria with symmetry beliefs: one
where all manufacturers delegate, and the other where all manufacturers integrate. But the
equilibrium where manufacturers sell through independent retailers both Pareto dominates (from
the manufacturers￿point of view) and risk dominates the one where manufacturers integrate.
The reason for our result is that, if retailers conjecture that other retailers are o⁄ered their
same contract, vertical separation generates a ￿ belief e⁄ect￿ : the wholesale price charged by
1Symmetry beliefs are much simpler than passive ones for retailers, in the following sense. With passive beliefs,
a retailer must be capable of computing manufacturers￿equilibrium contracts, given retailers￿optimal strategies,
in order to make a conjecture about his opponent￿ s input cost. By contrast, with symmetry beliefs a retailer
simply bases this conjecture on the manufacturer￿ s o⁄er, thus trusting her ability to choose the best contract.
So a retailer only needs to compute his own best strategy, given his input cost. Therefore, the assumption of
symmetry beliefs appears more natural when retailers face computational or cognitive constraints.
2In Appendix B we show that symmetry beliefs arise in a Hotelling model in which manufacturers are privately
informed about their common cost of production, and this cost has full support. Symmetry beliefs also arise when
retailers have di⁄use prior about manufacturers￿cost, or about a shock a⁄ecting this cost.
3See also Rey and Tirole (2007).
3a manufacturer a⁄ects the retailer￿ s beliefs about the contract o⁄ered to competing retailers
and, hence, about the retail price charged by the latter. Therefore, by increasing wholesale
prices, manufacturers manage to soften downstream competition, because retailers who pay
high wholesale prices expect competitors to pay high wholesale prices as well, and respond by
charging higher retail prices in equilibrium.4 Manufacturers can then charge a higher franchise
fee and obtain higher pro￿ts.
Hence, even with private contracts, manufacturers have an incentive to sell through inde-
pendent retailers, when retailers have symmetry beliefs.5 By doing so, manufacturers manage
to implicitly coordinate on high wholesale prices, since a manufacturer who charges a lower
wholesale price reduces the franchise fee that the retailer is willing to pay.
Our result that manufacturers choose vertical separation even with private contracts does
not hinge on retailers having exactly symmetry beliefs. Indeed, the belief e⁄ect that we have
described arises as long as a retailer who is o⁄ered a contract di⁄erent form the equilibrium one
assigns a positive probability, which can be arbitrarily small, to a rival retailer being o⁄ered the
same contract. As with symmetry beliefs, manufacturers can then obtain a strictly higher pro￿t
by selling through independent retailers, because they can induce them to sell at high prices.
We also compare manufacturers￿pro￿t with private and public contracts. Since each retailer
can observe other retailers￿contracts when those are public, and choose the preferred retail
price based on them, it may be expected that manufacturers always manage to achieve higher
pro￿ts with public contracts. However, this is not necessarily the case. Although with private
contracts a manufacturer can only a⁄ect the strategy of her own retailer, she can still charge a
higher franchise fee by choosing a high wholesale price. But since rival retailers do not respond
by increasing their prices, a high wholesale price also reduces the quantity sold by the retailer,
thus lowering the manufacturer￿ s wholesale revenue. On balance, a manufacturer obtains lower
pro￿t with private contracts when the strategic e⁄ect is not too strong ￿ i.e., when a retailer
does not increase his price too much in response to an increase of a rival￿ s price.6
Information sharing among ￿rms is usually considered anticompetitive (e.g., Briley, 1994).
Our results, however, suggest that, if retailers have symmetry beliefs, manufacturers may prefer
to keep information about wholesale prices private, precisely when public contracts would en-
hance consumer welfare by reducing retail prices. Hence, allowing retailers to obtain information
4With public contracts, the strategic e⁄ect of a high wholesale price is to induce competitors to charge high
prices. By contrast, with private contracts and symmetry beliefs, the e⁄ect of o⁄ering a high wholesale price is
to induce a retailer to believe that his competitors pay high wholesale prices, so that the retailer charges a high
retail price and expects high pro￿ts.
5Ko￿kesen (2007) analyzes an extensive form game in which principals can sign private contracts with ￿passive￿
agents (who only receive lump sum transfers), and shows that principals obtain higher pro￿t with delegation.
Delegation has a commitment value because principals can induce agents to play a ￿minmax strategy￿ if rival
principals do not delegate, regardless of the other agents￿action. By contrast, we require agents￿choices in the
downstream game to be part of a Nash equilibrium.
6By contrast, when competing retailers contract with a single monopolistic manufacturer, the manufacturer￿ s
pro￿ts with public contracts are always higher than those with private contracts (both with passive and with
symmetry beliefs). In fact, the commitment value of public contracts allow the manufacturer to obtain the
monopoly pro￿t (see, e.g., Rey and Tirole, 2007).
4about their rivals￿wholesale prices may actually increase competition.
Although we consider price competition in our main model, we obtain similar results with
quantity competition: with symmetry beliefs, manufacturers selling through independent retail-
ers obtain higher pro￿ts because of the belief e⁄ect of high wholesale prices. Moreover, with
quantity competition, since a retailer buys the manufacturer￿ s good before observing the realized
market price (and hence before observing the quantity sold by competing retailers), manufac-
turers manage to jointly obtain the monopoly pro￿t. By contrast, the strategic e⁄ect of public
contracts harms manufacturers with quantity competition, because it induces them to charge
lower wholesale prices (e.g., Fershtman and Judd, 1987). So manufacturers always prefer private
contracts, rather than public ones, when retailers￿choice variables are strategic substitutes.
Our results depend on manufacturers￿ability to charge franchise fees before retailers observe
the realized demand, when manufacturers can a⁄ect the retailers￿beliefs about the competitors￿
choices. A manufacturer can then charge a high franchise fee by choosing a high wholesale price,
even if other manufacturers do not choose high wholesale prices. This is consistent with the
observation that, in real-world contractual relations, franchise and royalty fees are usually paid
ex-ante and do not depend on the quantity sold by retailers.
Besides providing a new rationale for delegation in manufacturer-retailer relationships, our
results have implications for a wider range of economic situations involving competing verti-
cal chains. First, they suggest that various types of vertical restraints may soften downstream
competition with private contracts and symmetry beliefs. For instance, even with unobservable
contracts, exclusive territories may be used to reduce interbrand competition and raise man-
ufacturers￿pro￿ts. Second, in relation to the literature on the strategic design of managerial
incentives (e.g., Fershtman and Judd, 1987, and Sklivas, 1987), our model suggests that incentive
schemes di⁄erent from pro￿t maximization may have a strategic role even when these schemes
are private.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. After discussing
the case of passive beliefs in Section 3, in Section 4 we consider symmetry beliefs. Speci￿cally,
we ￿rst analyze prices and pro￿ts when: (i) all manufacturers are vertically integrated; (ii) all
manufacturers are vertically separated; and (iii) a vertically integrated manufacturer competes
against a vertically separated one. Then, in Section 4.3, we characterize the equilibrium choice
of organizational structure by manufacturers. Section 5 describes an example with linear de-
mand function, and Section 6 compares private with public contracts. Quantity competition is
discussed in Section 7. In Section 8 we show that our results hold with a more general class of
retailers￿beliefs. Finally, Section 9 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A. Appendix B shows
how symmetry beliefs can arise with incomplete information.
52 The Model
Players and environment. The game involves two competing vertical structures. There are
two (female) manufacturers, M1 and M2, that produce substitute goods, and two (male) exclu-
sive retailers, R1 and R2.7 In the downstream market, ￿rms compete by choosing retail prices.
(We consider the case of quantity competition in Section 7.) Manufacturers publicly choose their
organizational structure: vertical integration or vertical separation. If Mi is vertically integrated,
she chooses the retail price and sells directly to ￿nal consumers; if Mi is vertical separated, she
sells through retailer Ri, who independently chooses the retail price.
The retail price of the good produced by Mi is pi, and the (twice continuously di⁄erentiable)
demand function for this good in the downstream market is Di (pi;pj), with i;j = 1;2 and
i 6= j. We assume that Di (p;q) = Dj (p;q) for all prices p and q ￿ i.e., demand functions
are symmetric. All ￿rms have constant returns to scale, and manufacturers￿marginal cost of
production is normalized to zero.
Contracts. With vertical separation, Mi o⁄ers a two-part tari⁄ contract Ci = (wi;Ti) to Ri,
specifying a wholesale price wi and a franchise fee Ti. If Ri accepts the contract, he pays
Ti, chooses the retail price, and then pays wi for each unit sold in the downstream market.
Ri￿ s outside option is normalized to zero. We assume that contracts are private, so that a
retailer cannot observe the contract o⁄ered to his competitor. This assumption captures the
idea that manufacturers lack commitment power, because they can recontract and/or o⁄er secret
discounts.
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows:
￿ Period 1. Manufacturers simultaneously and publicly choose their organizational structure.
￿ Period 2. A vertically separated manufacturer secretly o⁄ers a contract to her exclusive
retailer. If the retailer accepts it, he pays the franchise fee and sells the manufacturer￿ s
good in period 3.
￿ Period 3. Firms ￿ i.e., an integrated manufacturer, or the retailers of a vertically separated
manufacturer ￿ simultaneously choose retail prices in the downstream market and, after
observing the realized demand, retailers pay the wholesale price for the quantity they
acquire from manufacturers.
Equilibrium concept. Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) (see,
e.g., Mas-Colell et al., 1995). A manufacturer￿ s strategy speci￿es the choice of organizational
structure and, depending on this choice, either the contract o⁄ered in period 2 or the retail price
7R1 and R2 can alternatively be interpreted as buyers of an intermediate good, that they transform into a
￿nal good through a ￿xed-coe¢ cient technology.
6charged in period 3. A retailer￿ s strategy speci￿es an acceptance decision in period 2 and the
retail price chosen in period 3, contingent on the contract o⁄ered by the manufacturer.
In order to describe retailers￿ ￿ o⁄-equilibrium￿ beliefs, de￿ne by e wj (wi) the belief of Ri
regarding the wholesale price o⁄ered to Rj, as a function of wi. We consider three types of
beliefs:
￿ Passive beliefs: When a retailer is o⁄ered a contract di⁄erent from the one he expects in
equilibrium, he does not revise his beliefs about the contract o⁄ered to the rival retailer.
Formally, given an equilibrium with wholesale prices w￿
1 and w￿
2, if Ri receives an o⁄er
wi 6= w￿
i, then e wj (wi) = w￿
j.
￿ Symmetry beliefs: Each retailer believes that his competitor is always o⁄ered a contract
equal to the contract o⁄ered by his own manufacturer. Formally, if Ri is o⁄ered a wholesale
price wi, then e wj (wi) = wi.8
￿ Mixed beliefs: Given an equilibrium with wholesale prices w￿
1 and w￿
2, if Ri is o⁄ered a
wholesale price wi 6= w￿
i, he believes that, with probability ￿, Rj is o⁄ered the same
wholesale price wi and, with probability (1 ￿ ￿), Rj is o⁄ered the equilibrium wholesale
price w￿
j.
In our main analysis we focus on passive and symmetry beliefs. In Section 8, we consider mixed
beliefs and show that our qualitative results hold as long as retailers￿beliefs are not exactly
passive ￿ i.e., as long as ￿ 6= 0.
Technical assumptions. Let ￿i (pi;pj) = Di (pi;pj)(pi ￿ wi) and ￿i (pi;pj) = Di (pi;pj)pi.
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8With symmetry beliefs, it is only possible to have symmetric equilibria, in which both manufacturers o⁄er
the same wholesale price, if they are vertically separated.
7Assumptions A1-A4 are standard in the vertical contracting literature (see for instance Rey
and Stiglitz, 1995, and Bonanno and Vickers, 1988). Following Vives (2000, p. 157), Assumption
A5 implies that the function @￿i (p;p)=@pi is downward sloping, and that @￿i (p;p)=@pi = 0 de-
￿nes the unique (interior) equilibrium, in a game with two symmetric integrated manufacturers.
3 Passive Beliefs
With passive beliefs, when a retailer receives an o⁄er di⁄erent from the one he expects in
equilibrium, he does not revise his beliefs about the o⁄er made to the rival retailer. In this case,
each manufacturer chooses a wholesale price equal to zero, regardless of the contract and the
organizational structure chosen by the competitor.
To see this, suppose both manufacturers are vertically separated, and denote by pj the price
chosen by Rj in equilibrium in period 3. Because of passive beliefs, Ri￿ s beliefs about Rj￿ s price
do not depend on wi. Hence, Ri￿ s reaction function is
pi (pj;wi) 2 argmax
pi
￿
Di (pi;pj)(pi ￿ wi) ￿ Ti
￿
:
Since the franchise fee Ti is a ￿xed cost, this program yields the standard ￿rst-order condition
equalizing Ri￿ s marginal revenue to marginal cost
@Di (pi (pj;wi);pj)
@pi
(pi (pj;wi) ￿ wi) + Di (pi (pj;wi);pj) ￿ 0: (1)
In period 2, Mi o⁄ers the contract that maximizes her pro￿t, subject to Ri￿ s participation




Di (pi (pj;wi);pj)wi + Ti : Di (pi (pj;wi);pj)(pi (pj;wi) ￿ wi) ￿ Ti ￿ 0
￿
:
Since Ti is chosen to satisfy Ri￿ s participation constraint as an equality, this simpli￿es to
wi 2 argmax
wi
Di (pi (pj;wi);pj)pi (pj;wi): (2)













wi ￿ 0: (3)
Lemma 1 With passive beliefs, if manufacturers choose vertical separation in period 1, in the
unique equilibrium wholesale prices are equal to zero.
8Since a retailer￿ s choice is una⁄ected by unobserved changes in the rival￿ s wholesale price,
each manufacturer acts as if integrated with the retailer and charges a wholesale price equal
to marginal cost.9 The next proposition states the well known neutrality that, with private
contracts and passive beliefs, vertical separation has no strategic e⁄ect (Katz, 1991).
Proposition 2 With passive beliefs, in any PBE the retail price pe solves
@Di (pe;pe)
@pi
pe + Di (pe;pe) = 0: (4)
Any combination of organizational structures is part of a PBE and yields the same manufactur-
ers￿pro￿t.
Hence, with passive beliefs, manufacturers have no incentive to sell through retailers.10 The
neutrality result, however, does not hold when agents have symmetry beliefs.
4 Symmetry Beliefs
Assume now that retailers have symmetry beliefs ￿ i.e., a retailer always believes that his
competitor receives the same o⁄er as he does (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990, and McAfee and
Schwartz, 1994). Hence, when a retailer receives from a manufacturer an o⁄er di⁄erent from
what he expects in equilibrium, he believes that the competing manufacturer has also deviated
from equilibrium by making the same o⁄er. Of course, in equilibrium retailers￿beliefs must be
consistent with manufacturers￿strategies.
In games of competing hierarchies, it is usually assumed that beliefs are passive. There seem
to be no compelling reason, however, to rule out symmetry beliefs a priori, especially when
upstream manufacturers are symmetric.11 Why should a retailer who receives an unexpected,
o⁄-equilibrium, o⁄er believe that a rival manufacturer is still o⁄ering the equilibrium contract? If
one manufacturer has an incentive to o⁄er a di⁄erent contract, another identical manufacturer
should have an incentive to do the same. Arguably, it is reasonable to assume that retailers
9As observed by McAfee and Schwartz (1994), this result does not hinge on the nature of downstream produc-
tion (￿xed versus variable proportions) or of downstream competition (strategic substitutes or strategic comple-
ments).
10Katz (1991) shows that this neutrality result does not hold with agency constraints, and that vertical sepa-
ration may have a commitment e⁄ect when principals and agents have con￿ icting preferences.
11When one (monopolistic) manufacturer contracts with two independent and competing retailers, it is usually
argued that symmetry beliefs are unappealing, since the manufacturer￿ s preferred contract with one retailer gen-
erally di⁄ers from the contract accepted by the other retailer (the ￿ opportunism problem￿in vertical contracting).
Moreover, it is argued, since the two retailers represent two separate markets, when the manufacturer changes the
o⁄er to one retailer, she has no incentive to also change the o⁄er to the other retailer (e.g., Rey and Tirole, 2007).
This criticism is much less compelling in games of competing hierarchies, where a manufacturer may have an
incentive to deviate from an equilibrium candidate in order to increase her pro￿t at the expense of the competing
manufacturer, but not to harm her own retailer. So if one manufacturer wants to o⁄er a di⁄erent contract, the
other manufacturer should want to do the same.
9expect deviations to be symmetric, and conjecture that identical manufacturers always o⁄er
identical contracts.
Alternatively, symmetry beliefs capture the idea that retailers are naive or have bounded
rationality, and so use the simplest conjecture that the strategy adopted by a rival manufacturer
is always identical to the strategy adopted by the manufacturer with whom they are contracting.
Retailers may ￿nd it too costly, or too di¢ cult, to compute the manufacturers￿equilibrium
contracts, based on the retailers￿optimal strategies (which is required with passive beliefs), and
simply prefer to infer the equilibrium contract from the manufacturer￿ s actual o⁄er.
Or retailers may be completely uninformed about some common characteristic of manufac-
turers that a⁄ect their choice of contract ￿ e.g., their production cost ￿ and so be unable to
determine the equilibrium contract.12 We develop this interpretation in Appendix B, where we
show that symmetry beliefs arise in the separating equilibrium of a Hotelling model in which
manufacturers are privately informed about their common cost of production.13
When both manufacturers are vertically integrated, beliefs are irrelevant because no contract
is o⁄ered. Hence, manufacturers choose the retail price that solves condition (4). In the next
two sections, we ￿rst analyze the case in which both manufacturers are vertically separated, and
then the asymmetric case in which one manufacturer is vertically separated, while the other is
not.
4.1 Vertical Separation
Suppose that both manufacturers choose vertical separation in period 1. First notice that the
equilibrium with passive beliefs characterized in Lemma 1 is not an equilibrium with symmetry
beliefs.
Lemma 3 If both manufacturers choose vertical separation, with symmetry beliefs there is no
PBE in which wholesale prices are equal to zero.
With passive beliefs, manufacturers cannot coordinate on a positive wholesale price because
each manufacturer has an incentive to secretly undercut it, in order to induce her retailer to
charge a lower retail price and obtain higher pro￿t. With symmetry beliefs, however, this incen-
tive is weakened because, if a manufacturer reduces the wholesale price, her retailer conjectures
that the other manufacturer is doing the same. Hence, the retailer expects to obtain lower pro￿t
and is willing to pay a lower franchise fee.
Given a contract Ci = (wi;Ti), Ri￿ s expected pro￿t, net of the franchise fee, is
Di(pi; e pj (wi))(pi ￿ wi) ￿ Ti;
12White (2007) analyzes the e⁄ect of private information in a model with a single monopolistic manufacturer
and two retailers.
13Another possible rationale for symmetry beliefs is that retailers interpret unexpected o⁄ers as trembles, or
mistakes, made by manufacturers, and that these trembles are perfectly correlated across identical players.
10where e pj (wi) ￿ e pj (e wj (wi)) is the price that Ri expects Rj to charge, when Ri conjectures that
Rj pays the wholesale price wi.
Let
^ p(wi) 2 argmax
pj
Dj (pj; ^ p(wi))(pj ￿ wi)
de￿ne the price chosen by Rj, when he is o⁄ered the wholesale price wi and believes that Ri,
having received the same o⁄er, also chooses ^ p(wi). By symmetry of the demand functions, ^ p(wi)
solves the following ￿rst-order condition, which is necessary and su¢ cient for an optimum under
assumptions A1-A4,
@Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(wi))
@pi
(^ p(wi) ￿ wi) + Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(wi)) ￿ 0: (5)
Therefore, when a retailer is o⁄ered the contract Ci = (wi;Ti), he expects his rival to choose a
retail price equal to ^ p(wi).
In period 2, a manufacturer o⁄ers the contract that maximizes her pro￿t subject to the
retailer￿ s participation constraint, given the retailer￿ s beliefs and the price charged by the com-
petitor.
Lemma 4 With symmetry beliefs, if both manufacturers choose vertical separation, in period 2




Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(w￿))wi + Ti : Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(wi))(^ p(wi) ￿ wi) ￿ Ti ￿ 0
￿
: (6)
Notice that, while Mi takes the competitor￿ s retail price as given (since she expects Mj to
o⁄er w￿ and Rj to choose ^ p(w￿) in equilibrium), Ri￿ s beliefs about the competitor￿ s retail price
depend on wi. Since Ri believes that Rj chooses ^ p(wi), he is willing to pay a franchise fee at most
equal to Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(wi))(^ p(wi) ￿ wi). Therefore, the wholesale price chosen by a manufacturer
a⁄ects the franchise fee also through its e⁄ect on the retailer￿ s conjecture about the competitor￿ s
retail price.




Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(w￿))wi + Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(wi))(^ p(wi) ￿ wi)
￿
: (7)
By the ￿ envelope theorem￿￿ i.e., using condition (5) ￿ the ￿rst-order condition is




w￿ + Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))+
+




(^ p(w￿) ￿ w￿) ￿ Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿)) ￿ 0: (8)
11A change in the wholesale price has two e⁄ects. First, wi a⁄ects the wholesale revenue
￿ Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(w￿))wi ￿ as re￿ ected by the ￿rst two terms in condition (8): a higher wi
increases the wholesale revenue for a given demand, but it also reduces demand because it
increases the retail price ^ p(wi). Second, wi has a ￿ belief e⁄ect￿because it a⁄ects Ri￿ s expected
pro￿t ￿ Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(wi))(^ p(wi) ￿ wi) ￿ and, hence, the franchise fee that he is willing to pay,
as re￿ ected by the last two terms in condition (8): a higher wi increases Ri￿ s input cost, which
reduces Ri￿ s expected pro￿t, but it also induces Ri to believe that Rj charges a higher retail
price, which increases Ri￿ s expected pro￿t.14
Simplifying equation (8), we have






@Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))
@pj




where the second term captures the ￿ belief e⁄ect￿ .
Denote the (equilibrium) price elasticity of demand by
"i
i (^ p(w￿)) = ￿
@ logDi (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))
@ logpi
;
and, similarly, the (equilibrium) cross price elasticity of demand by
"i
j (^ p(w￿)) =
@ logDi (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))
@ logpj
:
Proposition 5 When retailers have symmetry beliefs and both manufacturers choose vertical
separation in period 1:
￿ Given a wholesale price wi, in period 3 Ri chooses the retail price ^ p(wi) de￿ned by the
￿rst-order condition (5).
￿ In period 2, there is a symmetric PBE where both manufacturers o⁄er the contract C￿ =
(w￿;T￿) such that









T￿ = Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))(^ p(w￿) ￿ w￿):
￿ Mi￿ s pro￿t is Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿)) ^ p(w￿).
14Out of equilibrium, by choosing an appropriately high wholesale price, a manufacturer can ￿ fool￿the retailer
into believing that the other retailer is choosing any high retail price. Of course, the bene￿t of this must be
weighted against the reduction in demand caused by a high wholesale price.
12With symmetry beliefs, separated manufacturers charge higher wholesale prices (than in-
tegrated manufacturers, or separated ones with passive beliefs) to reduce competition among
retailers. Indeed, when a retailer is o⁄ered a high wholesale price, he believes that the competing
retailer receives the same o⁄er and chooses a high retail price. Hence, he expects high pro￿t
and is willing to pay a high franchise fee.
Equation (10) implies that w￿ is low when "i
i (:) is large because, if "i
i (:) is large, Mi does
not want Ri to charge a very high retail price (since this would cause a large reduction in
demand).15 Moreover, w￿ is high when "i
j (:) is large. The reason is that, if "i
j (:) is large, Ri
expects a relatively large increase in demand when he is o⁄ered a high wholesale price (since he
expects his competitor to choose a high retail price), and pays a high franchise fee.16
4.2 Asymmetric Vertical Structures
Suppose now that, in period 1, Mi chooses to sell her product through a retailer while Mj does
not. In this case, Mi has no incentive to increase her wholesale price, because Ri knows that his
competitor￿ s input cost is zero (since Mj is integrated), regardless of the wholesale price o⁄ered
by Mi. In other words, Mi cannot a⁄ect Ri￿ s beliefs in order to obtain a higher franchise fee.
To see this, suppose that Mj chooses the retail price pj. Given a contract Ci = (wi;Ti), Ri




Di(pi;pj)(pi ￿ wi) ￿ Ti
￿
:
Therefore, Ri￿ s best response function pe





i (wi) ￿ wi) + Di(pe
i (wi);pj) ￿ 0:






i (wi);pj)wi + Ti : Di(pe
i (wi);pj)(pe
i (wi) ￿ wi) ￿ Ti ￿ 0
￿
:














16This is consistent with the evidence discussed in Lafontaine and Slade (1997), who show that retail prices of
delegated outlets are higher when the cross-price elasticity of demand is large relative to the own-price elasticity,
and when reaction functions are steep. They also show that delegation is more likely in these cases.











@wi > 0 and
@Di(:)
@pi < 0, this derivative is strictly negative for every wi > 0. Hence, we
have the following result.
Lemma 6 When one manufacturer is vertically integrated while the other is vertically separated,
the separated manufacturer charges a wholesale price equal to zero. In period 3, there is a unique
equilibrium in which both goods are sold at the retail price pe such that
@Di (pe;pe)
@pi
pe + Di (pe;pe) = 0:
Notice that the equilibrium retail price is equal to the one with two integrated manufac-
turers, or with passive beliefs (see Proposition 2). Hence, the pro￿t obtained by a vertically
separated manufacturer competing against an integrated manufacturer is equal to the pro￿t of
an integrated manufacturer.
4.3 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the equilibrium choice of organizational structure by manufactur-
ers. In order to do so, we start by comparing the retail price when both manufacturers choose
separation with the retail price when at least one manufacturer chooses integration.
Lemma 7 The equilibrium retail price with two vertically separated manufacturers is higher
than the equilibrium retail price with at least one vertically integrated manufacturer ￿ i.e.,
p￿ ￿ ^ p(w￿) > pe.
In contrast to an integrated manufacturer, a manufacturer selling through a retailer has an
incentive to o⁄er a strictly positive wholesale price, in order to induce the retailer to believe
that his competitor also pays a positive wholesale price and, hence, chooses a high retail price.
The retailer is then willing to sell at a high retail price and pay a high franchise fee. Therefore,
both wholesale and retail prices are higher when manufacturers sell through retailers.
Since manufacturers extract the whole surplus from retailers, manufactures￿pro￿ts when














14where ￿i (p;p) = Di (p;p)p.
Proposition 8 With symmetry beliefs, there are two equilibria: one where both manufacturers
choose vertical integration and one where both manufacturers choose vertical separation in period
1. The equilibrium where both manufacturers choose separation Pareto dominates, and risk
dominates, the one where they both choose integration.
In the proof of Proposition 8, we show that ￿i (p￿;p￿) > ￿i (pe;pe), since p￿ > pe by Lemma
7 and both prices are lower than the price that maximizes the function ￿i (p;p) (which is strictly
concave by Assumption A5). Therefore, vertical separation is also a weakly dominant strategy
for manufacturers. The intuition is that, when one manufacturer is vertically separated, the other
manufacturer prefers to choose vertical separation too, in order to commit not to undercut the
competitor, when the latter charges a high wholesale price.
Hence, we expect both manufacturers to sell through independent retailers, when those
retailers have symmetry beliefs. By choosing vertical separation and charging high wholesale
prices, manufacturers induce retailers to sell at high retail prices, thus reducing competition and
increasing pro￿t.17
5 The Linear Example
We analyze a simple example with linear inverse demand function Pi (qi;qj) = ￿ ￿ ￿qi ￿ ￿qj,
where qi is the quantity of the good produced by Mi that is sold in the retail market. This is
a natural and often analyzed demand function (see, e.g., Vives, 2000). We assume that ￿ > 0
and ￿ > ￿ ￿ 0, so that inverting the system of inverse demand functions yields direct demand
functions
Di (pi;pj) =
￿(￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿pi + ￿pj
￿2 ￿ ￿2 , i = 1;2:
The parameter ￿ re￿ ects the degree of substitutability among products.
First consider passive beliefs. Vertically separated manufacturers charge a wholesale price








(2￿ ￿ ￿)2(￿ + ￿)
:
Now consider symmetry beliefs. Using equations (5) and (9), when both manufacturers
17Clearly, manufacturers￿pro￿t when retailers have symmetry beliefs are higher than their pro￿t when retailers
have passive beliefs (since in this last case the retail price is p
e).
15choose vertical separation the unique equilibrium wholesale price is
w￿ =
￿￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
2￿2 ￿ ￿2 > we = 0;





2￿2 ￿ ￿2 :
Therefore, in the Pareto dominant equilibrium, a manufacturer￿ s pro￿t is
￿￿ =
￿2￿2 (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
2￿2 ￿ ￿2￿2 :
Finally,
pe ￿ p￿ = ￿






￿e ￿ ￿￿ = ￿
￿2￿2￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
￿2 + ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
2￿2 ￿ ￿2￿2 (2￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ + ￿)
< 0:
As expected by Proposition 8, retail prices and manufacturers￿pro￿ts are higher when they are
vertically separated than when they are integrated. Clearly, prices and pro￿ts with separation
and integration are equal when ￿ = 0, since products are independent. Moreover, the di⁄erence
between prices and pro￿ts with separation and integration tends to zero as ￿ ! ￿, because
products become closer substitutes and manufacturers competing ￿ la Bertrand make zero pro￿t.
6 Private vs. Public Contracts
In this section, we compare retail prices of vertically separated manufacturers with private and
public contracts.
With public contracts, a retailer observes both manufacturers￿wholesale prices and chooses
the retail price that solves
max
pi
Di (pi;pj)(pi ￿ wi);
yielding the ￿rst-order conditions
@Di (pi;pj)
@pi
(pi ￿ wi) + Di (pi;pj) = 0; i = 1;2: (12)
These conditions de￿ne the function pi (wi;wj).18
Since a manufacturer chooses the franchise fee so that the retailer￿ s participation constraint
18Of course, under our assumptions, pi (wi;wj) is increasing in both wi and wj.
16is binding, Mi solves
max
wi
Di (pi (wi;wj);pj (wj;wi))pi (wi;wj):













pi (:) = 0; i = 1;2, (13)
and the equilibrium retail price is p￿￿ = p(w￿￿;w￿￿). The second term in equation (13) represents
the strategic e⁄ect: when choosing the wholesale price, Mi anticipates Rj￿ s reaction, and the
resulting e⁄ect on his own product￿ s demand (see Bonanno and Vickers, 1988, and Rey and
Stiglitz, 1995). Since prices are strategic complements, the strategic e⁄ect of an increase in wi
on Mi￿ s pro￿t is positive.
Let ’(pjjwi) be Ri￿ s reaction function in period 3, given pj and wi, de￿ned by condition (12).
Then ￿ (w￿￿) ￿ @’(p￿￿jw￿￿)=@pj is the slope of a retailer￿ s reaction function, in the symmetric
equilibrium with wholesale price w￿￿. To simplify the analysis, we assume that there is a unique
equilibrium both with public and with private contracts.
Proposition 9 Assume that manufacturers￿pro￿ts are single-peaked both with private and with
public contracts. With symmetry beliefs, wholesale prices, retail prices and manufacturers￿pro￿ts
are higher (resp. lower) with private contracts than with public contracts if and only if
p￿￿ ￿ w￿￿
p￿￿ > ￿ (p￿￿) (resp. < ). (14)
Public contracts allow retailers to observe the wholesale price paid by competitors and re-
spond to it, thus creating a strategic e⁄ect that facilitates coordination among players. The
strategic e⁄ect is captured by the right-hand-side of condition (14), and its strength depends on
retailers￿reaction function. On the other hand, with private contracts, manufactures can induce
retailers to expect a high price from their competitors and, hence, to pay a high franchise fee,
regardless of the wholesale price that competitors actually pay. The belief e⁄ect is captured by
the left-hand-side of condition (14), and its strength depends on retailers￿price-cost markup.
By condition (14), the strategic e⁄ect dominates the belief e⁄ect when the retailer￿ s reaction
function with public contracts is relatively steep ￿ i.e., when an increase in a retailer￿ s price
induces a large increase in the competitor￿ s price with public contracts, which in turn increases
the manufacturer￿ s wholesale revenue.
To see the intuition for this result, consider the equilibrium wholesale price with public
contracts w￿￿. Does a manufacturer have an incentive to charge a price higher than w￿￿ when
contracts are private? There are two e⁄ects. First, a higher wholesale price induces the retailer
to expect higher pro￿t (since he expects the competitor￿ s retail price to be higher). Hence, the
retailer is willing to pay a higher franchise fee. Second, however, a higher wholesale price also
induces the retailer to choose a higher retail price, while the other retailer still chooses p￿￿.
17Hence, the ￿rst retailer sells a lower quantity, and the manufacturer obtains a lower wholesale
revenue. This second, negative, e⁄ect is stronger when the slope of the reaction functions at p￿￿
is larger, because in this case the increase in the retailer￿ s price is larger, resulting in a larger
reduction in demand.
Therefore, although public contracts have a commitment values for competing manufacturers,
with symmetry beliefs manufacturers￿pro￿t may be higher with private contracts than with
public ones, and manufacturers may prefer not to share information about their retail contracts
with competitors. By contrast, when a single monopolistic manufacturer sells to competing
retailers, her pro￿t is maximized by public contracts (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990).




￿(4￿2 ￿ ￿2 ￿ 2￿￿)
;
and










Hence, wholesale prices are higher with private contracts.19 Similarly, also retail prices and
manufacturers￿pro￿ts are higher with private contracts.
7 Quantity Competition
Suppose that ￿rms compete by choosing the quantity produced, rather than the retail price. In
this case, if a manufacturer chooses vertical separation, in period 3 the retailer ￿rst acquires the
quantity he chooses to produce, paying the wholesale price, and then sells it to ￿nal consumers
at the market clearing price.
Let P(Q) be the demand function, where Q = qi + qj is the total quantity produced. We
assume that P0 (:) < 0 and P00 (:) ￿ 0.
Private contracts. As in the case of price competition, with private contracts and passive
beliefs, vertical separation has no strategic e⁄ect (see Proposition 2). In the unique equilibrium
with vertically separated manufacturers, the wholesale price is equal to zero and each retailer
sells the quantity qe such that
P0 (2qe)qe + P (2qe) = 0: (15)
This is the same quantity produced by each of two integrated manufacturers. Therefore, any
combination of organizational structures is a PBE and yields manufacturers￿pro￿t equal to
P (2qe)qe.
By contrast, with symmetry beliefs, each manufacturer has an incentive to charge a wholesale
price greater than zero when she is vertically separated, in order to induce the retailer to produce
19With a linear demand, the condition of Proposition 9 is
p￿￿￿w￿￿




18a lower quantity and to expect his competitor to do the same. The retailer is then willing to
pay a higher franchise fee, because he anticipates higher pro￿ts. This con￿rms the insight of our
analysis with price competition: a positive wholesale price reduces competition among retailers
when they have symmetry beliefs.
Proposition 10 With symmetry beliefs and quantity competition, if both manufacturers choose
vertical separation in period 1:
￿ Given a wholesale price wi, in period 3 Ri produces the quantity ^ q (wi) such that
P0 (2^ q (wi)) ^ q (wi) + P (2^ q (wi)) ￿ wi ￿ 0: (16)
￿ In period 2, there is a symmetric PBE where both manufacturers o⁄er the contract C￿ =
(w￿;T￿) such that
w￿ ￿ ￿P0 (2^ q (w￿)) ^ q (w￿) > 0; (17)
and
T￿ = (P (2^ q (w￿)) ￿ w￿)^ q (w￿): (18)
￿ Mi￿ s pro￿t is P (2^ q (w￿)) ^ q (w￿), and each retailer produces the quantity ^ q (w￿) < qe.
The quantity produced by a retailer when the manufacturer is vertically separated, ^ q (w￿), is
equal to half the quantity produced by a monopolist. Hence, vertically separated manufacturers
manage to maximize joint pro￿t. Each manufacturer obtains higher pro￿t than with price
competition because, with quantity competition, a retailer buys from the manufacturer before
observing the market price and learning the quantity chosen by his competitor (while with
price competition, he only buys from the manufacturer after observing the price chosen by his
competitor). Hence, a manufacturer can extract the whole total expected surplus from the
retailer ex-ante, via the franchise fee and the wholesale payment.20
A vertically separated manufacturer induces the retailer to produce a lower quantity than a
vertically integrated manufacturer because of the ￿ belief e⁄ect.￿Hence, consider manufacturers￿
choice between vertical separation and integration.
Proposition 11 With symmetry beliefs and quantity competition, there are two equilibria: one
where both manufacturers choose vertical integration and one where both manufacturers choose
vertical separation in period 1. The equilibrium where both manufacturers choose separation
Pareto dominates, and risk dominates, the one where they both choose integration.
20In contrast to price competition, a manufacturer has no incentive to reduce the wholesale price in order to
increase the wholesale revenue, when she expects the rival manufacturer to charge a high wholesale price: if Mi
reduces the wholesale price, Ri conjectures that Mj also reduced the wholesale price and, hence, he does not
produce a much larger quantity.
19As in the case of price competition, manufacturers￿pro￿ts with vertical separation exceed
those with vertical integration. Therefore, even with quantity competition, it is a weakly dom-
inant strategy for manufacturers to choose vertical separation in order to reduce competition
among retailers, when retailers have symmetry beliefs.
Public contracts. In contrast to price competition, with quantity competition and public
contracts manufacturers charge lower wholesale prices if they are vertically separated (than if
they are integrated). The reason is that a lower wholesale price tends to increase the quantity
produced by the retailer and, since quantities are strategic substitutes, this induces the com-
peting retailer to respond by reducing his own quantity (Vickers, 1983). Ceteris paribus, this
strategic e⁄ect increases manufacturer￿ s pro￿t. Therefore, both manufacturers have an incentive
to choose vertical separation, but they obtain lower pro￿ts by doing so, since the total quantity
produced is higher (Fershtman and Judd, 1987, and Vickers, 1983).
Proposition 12 With symmetry beliefs and quantity competition, wholesale prices and manu-
facturers￿pro￿ts are higher with private than with public contracts.
In the proof of Proposition 12, we show that the equilibrium wholesale price with public
contracts is lower than manufacturers￿marginal cost (hence, lower than zero in our model).
Therefore, retailers produce larger quantities and charge lower prices with public contracts.
This reduces manufacturers￿pro￿ts compared to private contracts.
Our analysis suggests that, when retailers compete by choosing the quantity produced and
have symmetry beliefs, manufacturers always prefer to maintain contracts private, rather than
disclose them to competitors. Indeed, with quantity competition, the strategic e⁄ect of public
contracts harms manufacturers, while private contracts have a positive belief e⁄ect.
8 Mixed Beliefs
In Section 4 we showed that, if retailers have symmetry rather than passive beliefs, manufacturers
are not indi⁄erent between vertical separation and vertical integration. Passive and symmetry
beliefs, however, may be considered two opposite and extreme assumptions. It is worth asking
how robust is the neutrality result of passive beliefs to a small change in retailers￿beliefs. In
order to answer this question we consider mixed beliefs, a more general class of beliefs that
includes passive and symmetry beliefs as special cases (when ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1, respectively).
For ￿ 2 (0;1), mixed beliefs capture the idea that, after being o⁄ered a contract di⁄erent
from the equilibrium one, a retailer is uncertain about the contract o⁄ered to the rival retailer
and assigns a positive probability ￿, which can be arbitrarily small, to the other manufacturer
o⁄ering the same contract, rather than the equilibrium one.
Consider a symmetric equilibrium with wholesale price w￿
￿ and retail price p￿
￿. With mixed
beliefs, if Ri is o⁄ered a wholesale price wi 6= w￿
￿, he believes that, with probability ￿, Rj is
20o⁄ered the same wholesale price wi while, with probability (1 ￿ ￿), Rj is o⁄ered the equilibrium
wholesale price w￿
￿ and therefore chooses the equilibrium retail price p￿
￿. Hence, Ri￿ s objective
function is
(pi ￿ wi)[(1 ￿ ￿)Di (pi;p￿
￿) + ￿Di (pi; ^ pj)]; (19)
where ^ pj is the retail price that Ri expects Rj to choose when Rj is o⁄ered wi. In this case, Rj
has exactly the same beliefs as Ri when he is o⁄ered wi, and therefore has the same objective
function (19).
Let




(1 ￿ ￿)Di (pi;p￿
￿) + ￿Di (pi; ^ pj)
￿
; (20)
de￿ne the retail price chosen by Ri if he is o⁄ered the wholesale price wi. By symmetry of the
demand functions, ^ p￿ (wi) is also the price chosen by Rj when he is o⁄ered wi and, by de￿nition,
p￿
￿ = ^ p￿ (w￿
￿). Therefore, the ￿rst-order condition for (20) is
(1 ￿ ￿)Di (^ p￿ (wi);p￿
￿) + ￿Di (^ p￿ (wi); ^ p￿ (wi))+
(^ p￿ (wi) ￿ wi)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
















Di (^ p￿ (wi); ^ p￿ (w￿
￿))wi+
￿
￿Di (^ p￿(wi); ^ p￿(wi)) + (1 ￿ ￿)Di (^ p￿ (wi); ^ p￿ (w￿
￿))
￿




￿ satis￿es Ri￿ s participation constraint as an equality. Therefore, by the Envelope Theorem
￿ i.e., using condition (21) ￿ the equilibrium wholesale price w￿
￿ solves
@Di (^ p￿ (w￿







￿ + Di (^ p￿ (w￿
￿); ^ p￿ (w￿
￿))+
+￿
@Di (^ p￿ (w￿








￿) ￿ Di (^ p￿ (w￿
￿); ^ p￿ (w￿
￿)) ￿ 0;
,
@Di (^ p￿ (w￿





@Di (^ p￿ (w￿





￿) ￿ 0: (22)
The second term of condition (22) represents the belief e⁄ect. Comparing this with condition
(9), the belief e⁄ect is weaker with mixed than with symmetry beliefs. Moreover, by inspection:
(i) w￿
￿ = 0 for ￿ = 0, as with passive beliefs; (ii) w￿
￿ = w￿ for ￿ = 1, as with symmetry beliefs;
and (iii) w￿
￿ > 0 for every ￿ 6= 0.
Proposition 13 Assume that retailers have mixed beliefs and ￿ 2 (0;1). When both manu-
facturers are vertically separated, each manufacturer o⁄ers the wholesale price w￿
￿ de￿ned by
equation (22), where 0 < w￿
￿ < w￿, and each retailer chooses the retail price ^ p￿ (w￿
￿), where
21^ p￿ (:) is de￿ned by equation (21) and pe < ^ p￿ (w￿
￿) < ^ p(w￿). In period 1, vertical separation is
a weakly dominant strategy for manufacturers, for every ￿ 6= 0.
With mixed beliefs, vertically separated manufacturers charge strictly positive wholesale
prices and obtain higher pro￿t than integrated ones, although their pro￿t is not as high as
with symmetry beliefs. Therefore, our qualitative results hold as long as, when a manufacturer
o⁄ers a contract di⁄erent from the equilibrium one, the retailer is not certain that the other
manufacturer is still o⁄ering the equilibrium contract and assigns some positive probability to
the other manufacturer o⁄ering the same contract. An arbitrarily small uncertainty is su¢ cient
to generate the belief e⁄ect and allows manufacturers to obtain higher pro￿t by selling through
retailers. The neutrality result hinges on retailers￿beliefs being exactly passive.
9 Conclusions
Manufacturers strictly prefer to sell through independent retailers who have symmetry (or at
least not completely passive) beliefs, even if contracts are private and regardless of the nature of
competition in the retail market. The reason is that, by charging high wholesale prices, manu-
facturers manipulate retailers￿beliefs about competitors￿strategies, thus reducing competition
among retailers and increasing pro￿t. Manufacturers may even prefer to keep contracts private,
rather than disclose them to competitors, precisely because private contracts allow manufactur-
ers to a⁄ect retailers￿beliefs about the contracts o⁄ered to competitors.
With private contracts, vertical separation can also arise because of asymmetric information
between manufacturers and retailers ￿ see Caillaud, Jullien and Picard (1995) for the case of
adverse selection, and Katz (1991) for the case of moral hazard. Our analysis, however, shows
that vertical separation does not require asymmetric information. In future work we plan to
analyze vertical separation with both asymmetric information and symmetry beliefs.
22A Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof follows from (3) and the fact that
@Di(:)
@pi < 0 and
@pi(:)
@wi > 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. When manufacturers are vertically separated, condition (4) follows
from Lemma 1 and equation (1). Under assumptions A1-A4, this condition is necessary and
su¢ cient for an optimum. Clearly, condition (4) also de￿nes the retail price chosen by an
integrated manufacturer. Hence, the equilibrium retail price and the manufacturers￿pro￿t do
not depend on the organizational structure chosen by manufacturers in period 1. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. We show that wi = wj = 0 is not an equilibrium with symmetry beliefs.
To see this, suppose that wj = 0. Then Mi solves
max
wi
Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(0))wi + D(^ p(wi); ^ p(wi))(^ p(wi) ￿ wi):
The derivative of the objective function evaluated at wi = 0 is




wi + Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(0)) ￿ Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(wi))+
+

















^ p(0) > 0:
Therefore, when Mj charges a wholesale price equal to 0, it is not a best reply for Mi to choose
wi = 0. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. If Mi expects her rival to o⁄er the contract C￿ = (w￿;T￿), she expects
Rj to choose price ^ p(w￿) (since Rj believes that Ri pays his same wholesale price w￿). Hence,
Mi￿ s objective function is Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(w￿))wi + Ti. Moreover, Ri￿ s participation constraint is
Di (^ p(wi); ^ p(wi))(^ p(wi) ￿ wi) ￿ Ti ￿ 0,
because he believes that Rj pays the wholesale price wi and sells at price ^ p(wi). ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. From equation (5), it follows that, given wholesale prices w1 and w2,



















This is strictly positive by Assumption A5.
23Consider a symmetric equilibrium with wholesale contract C￿ = (w￿;T￿) and retail price
^ p(w￿). By equation (5), which de￿nes the function ^ p(:),
@Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))
@pi
w￿ =
@Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))
@pi
^ p(w￿) + Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿)):
Substituting this in equation (9), that de￿nes w￿, we have
@Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))
@pi
^ p(w￿) + Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿)) +
@Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))
@pj
(^ p(w￿) ￿ w￿) = 0 (23)
,
@Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))
@pi
^ p(w￿)
Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))
+ 1+
+
@Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))
@pj
^ p(w￿)
Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))






















To prove the existence of an equilibrium satisfying this condition, notice that: (i) the ￿rst-
order condition (9) is continuous in w since ^ p(:) is continuous and Di (:) is twice continuously
di⁄erentiable by assumption; (ii) the derivative of the manufacturer￿ s pro￿t is strictly positive
at wi = wj = 0 (see equation (9)); (iii) by equation (23), the derivative of the manufacturer￿ s
pro￿t tends to ￿1 as wi and wj tend to +1 because
lim
w!1
Di (^ p(w); ^ p(w)) = 0




@Di (^ p(w); ^ p(w))
@pj
+
@Di (^ p(w); ^ p(w))
@pi
￿
^ p(w) < 0
by Assumption A2.
Finally, Mi extracts the whole retailer￿ s surplus by charging a franchise fee equal to
T￿ = Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿))(^ p(w￿) ￿ w￿);
and obtains a pro￿t equal to Di (^ p(w￿); ^ p(w￿)) ^ p(w￿). ￿
Proof of Lemma 6. Given the equilibrium price pe
i chosen by Ri, the price chosen by the












Since Mi chooses wi = 0, as implied by equation (11), Ri also chooses a retail price satisfying
condition (24). Therefore, under Assumption A5, there is a unique equilibrium in which both
24the integrated manufacturer and Ri choose the same retail price pe. (This is the price that
would be chosen in the unique equilibrium with two integrated ￿rms.) ￿
Proof of Lemma 7. From Lemma 6, recall that pe is de￿ned by
@Di (pe;pe)
@pi
pe + Di (pe;pe) = 0: (25)
From Section 4.2, recall that the ￿rst order condition for the choice of p￿ ￿ ^ p(w￿) is
@Di (p￿;p￿)
@pi
(p￿ ￿ w￿) + Di (p￿;p￿) = 0; (26)






(p￿ ￿ w￿) = 0: (27)
Hence, substituting condition (26) in (27), p￿ must satisfy
@Di (p￿;p￿)
@pi
p￿ + Di (p￿;p￿) = ￿
@Di (p￿;p￿)
@pj
(p￿ ￿ w￿): (28)
Consider the function ￿(p) ￿
@Di(p;p)
@pi p+Di (p;p), which is decreasing by assumption A5. By
condition (25), pe is such that ￿(pe) = 0. By condition (28), and since
@Di(:)
@pj > 0 and p￿ > w￿,
p￿ is such that ￿(p￿) < 0. Therefore, it must be that p￿ > pe. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider the function ￿(p) ￿ ￿i (p;p) = Di (p;p) ￿ p. The pro￿t
obtained by an integrated manufacturer competing against another integrated manufacturer
is equal to ￿(pe). When one manufacturer is vertically separated while the other is not, the
pro￿t obtained by each manufacturer is also equal to ￿(pe) by Lemma 6. Therefore, there
exists an equilibrium in which both manufacturers choose vertical integration (since given that
a manufacturer chooses integration, the other is indi⁄erent between integration and separation).
The pro￿t obtained by a vertically separated manufacturer when competing against an-
other vertically separated manufacturer is equal to ￿(p￿). In order to show that there is also
an equilibrium in which both manufactures choose vertical separation, we need to show that
￿(p￿) ￿ ￿(pe).















pM + Di ￿
pM;pM￿
= 0:
Clearly, ￿0 (p) > 0 if and only if p < pM.







@pj > 0 by assumption, ￿0 (p￿) > 0 and, therefore, pM > p￿. Moreover, by Lemma
7, p￿ > pe. Summing up, pM > p￿ > pe and, therefore, ￿
￿
pM￿
> ￿(p￿) > ￿(pe). This
also proves that manufacturers obtain higher pro￿ts in the equilibrium where they both choose
vertical separation than in the equilibrium where they both choose integration. By inspection,
the former equilibrium is also risk dominant. ￿





























Consider now private contracts. From equation (28), the derivative of Mi￿ s objective function
with symmetry beliefs, evaluated at pi = pj = p￿￿ and wi = wj = w￿￿, is
@Di (p￿￿;p￿￿)
@pi
p￿￿ + Di (p￿￿;p￿￿) +
@Di (p￿￿;p￿￿)
@pj
(p￿￿ ￿ w￿￿): (30)











((1 ￿ ￿ (p￿￿))p￿￿ ￿ w￿￿): (31)
Uniqueness of the equilibrium with private contracts implies that p￿ > p if and only if the
derivative of the manufacturer￿ s objective function evaluated at p is greater than zero. (By the
assumptions on Di (:), this derivative is continuous.) Therefore, since
@Di(:)
@pj > 0, p￿ > p￿￿ if and
26only if equation (31) is positive ￿ i.e.,
((1 ￿ ￿ (p￿￿))p￿￿ ￿ w￿￿) > 0 ,
p￿￿ ￿ w￿￿
p￿￿ > ￿ (p￿￿):
Clearly, p￿ < p￿￿ if and only if
p￿￿ ￿ w￿￿
p￿￿ < ￿ (p￿￿):
Finally, it is immediate to show that the same condition also ranks wholesale prices and manu-
facturers￿pro￿ts with private and public contracts.











< 0; 8w ￿ p:
See Rey and Stiglitz (1995) for conditions that guarantee that manufacturers￿pro￿ts are single-
peaked with public contracts. ￿
Proof of Proposition 10. With symmetry beliefs, if Mi o⁄ers the wholesale price wi, Ri conjectures
that: (i) Mj o⁄ered wi to Rj, and (ii) Rj believes that Mi o⁄ered wi to Ri. Hence, since for
every wi Ri expects Rj to choose his same quantity, Ri chooses ^ q (wi) such that
^ q (wi) 2 argmax
qi
(P(qi + ^ q (wi)) ￿ wi)qi:
This immediately implies condition (16).
Consider a symmetric equilibrium in which both manufacturers charge a franchise fee T￿
de￿ned by equation (18). Then each manufacturer chooses the wholesale price to solve
max
wi
f^ q (wi)wi + (P (2^ q (wi)) ￿ wi)^ q (wi)g:
Using the envelope theorem, the ￿rst-order condition of this problem is
w￿ + P0(2^ q (w￿))^ q (w￿) = 0:
This immediately implies equation (17). Moreover, w￿ > 0. Equation (18) hold because, to
extract the whole retailers￿surplus, manufacturers charge a franchise fee such that
(P (2^ q (w￿)) ￿ w￿)^ q (w￿) ￿ T￿ = 0:
Given contract C￿ = (w￿;T￿), each retailer produces the quantity ^ q (w￿) de￿ned by (16).
Comparing this with equation (15) it follows that ^ q (w￿) < qe. Finally, a manufacturer￿ s pro￿t
is equal to P (2^ q (w￿)) ^ q (w￿). ￿
Proof of Proposition 11. The proof follows the same logic of the proof of Proposition 8.
Indeed, it is straightforward to show that: (i) when both manufacturers choose integration,
their marginal cost is zero by assumption; (ii) when one manufacturer chooses integration while
27the other chooses separation, since the integrated manufacturer￿ s marginal cost is zero, the
separated manufacturer charges a wholesale price equal to zero. In both cases, each retailer
produces the quantity qe de￿ned by condition (15). Hence, there is an equilibrium where both
manufacturers choose integration.
To prove that there is also an equilibrium where both manufacturers choose separation, and
that this equilibrium Pareto dominates (and also risk dominates) the equilibrium where both
manufacturers choose integration, we show that manufacturers￿pro￿ts with separation ￿ i.e.,
P (2^ q (w￿)) ^ q (w￿) ￿ are larger than manufacturers￿pro￿ts with integration ￿ i.e., P (2qe)qe.
Let ￿(q) = P (2q)q. The function ￿(q) is strictly concave by the assumption on P (:), and has
a unique maximum at q￿ such that
2P0 (2q￿)q￿ + P (2q￿) = 0:
By equation (16) and (17) it follows that
2P0 (2^ q (w￿)) ^ q (w￿) + P (2^ q (w￿)) = 0:
Hence, ^ q (w￿) maximizes ￿(q), and P (2^ q (w￿)) ^ q (w￿) > P (2q)q for every q 6= ^ q (w￿). Notice
that 2^ q (w￿) is the quantity produced by a monopolist. ￿
Proof of Proposition 12. First consider public contracts. Given contracts Ci = (wi;Ti) and
Cj = (wj;Ti), equilibrium quantities are determined by the ￿rst-order conditions
P0 (qi + qj)qi + P (qi + qj) ￿ wi = 0; i = 1;2: (32)
These conditions de￿ne the quantities q1 (w1;w2) and q2 (w2;w1) produced by the two retailers,




fqi (wi;wj)wi + (P(qi (wi;wj) + qj (wj;wi)) ￿ wi)qi (wi;wj)g:
Using the envelope theorem, the ￿rst-order condition is
@qi (wi;wj)
@wi
wi + P0(qi (wi;wj) + qj (wj;wi))
@qj (wj;wi)
@wi
qi (wi;wj) = 0:








It is immediate to verify that
@qi(:)
@wi < 0 and that
@qj(:)
@wi > 0, so that w￿￿ < 0.
As shown by Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987), regardless of the organizational
structure chosen by the competitor, with public contracts each manufacturer obtains a higher
pro￿t with vertical separation than with integration. Hence, manufacturers choose vertical
separation with public contracts.
28Now consider private contracts. Since w￿ > 0, comparing equations (15) and (32), it fol-
lows that the quantity produced by retailers is lower with private contracts than with public
contracts ￿ i.e., ^ q (w￿) < q￿￿. Finally, manufacturers￿pro￿ts with private contracts ￿ i.e.,
P (2^ q (w￿)) ^ q (w￿) ￿ are higher than with private contracts ￿ i.e., P (2q￿￿)q￿￿ ￿ since the
function ￿(q) = P (2q)q has a unique maximum at ^ q (w￿) (see the proof of Proposition 11). ￿
Proof of Proposition 13. By inspection of the ￿rst order condition (22), 0 < w￿
￿ < w￿ for
￿ 2 (0;1). To analyze how the equilibrium retail price changes as wi changes, apply the implicit








































Hence, under assumptions A1, A2 and A5,
d^ p￿(wi)
dwi > 0.
When wi = w￿
￿ = 0, condition (21) is identical to condition (4) and, hence, ^ p￿ (0) = pe.
In equilibrium, when wi = w￿
￿, condition (21) is also identical to condition (5) and, hence,
^ p￿(wi) = ^ p(wi). Therefore, the retail price with vertical separation and mixed beliefs is higher
than the retail price with vertical integration ￿ i.e., ^ p￿ (w￿
￿) > pe for all ￿ > 0 ￿ and lower
than the retail price with vertical separation and symmetry beliefs ￿ i.e., ^ p￿ (w￿
￿) < ^ p(w￿) for
all ￿ < 1.
The proof that delegation is a weakly dominant strategy for manufacturers, for every ￿ > 0,
follows the proof of Proposition 8: since equilibrium retail prices when both manufacturers choose
vertical separation are higher than equilibrium retail prices when one or more manufacturers
choose vertical integration, and equilibrium retail prices when only one manufacturer chooses
vertical separation are equal to equilibrium retail prices when both manufacturers choose vertical
integration, a manufacturer obtains a (weakly) higher pro￿t if she chooses vertical separation. As
with symmetry beliefs, for every ￿ > 0, there are two equilibria: one where both manufacturers
choose vertical separation and one where they both choose vertical integration. But the former
equilibrium Pareto dominates, and risk dominates, the latter equilibrium. ￿
29B Hotelling Model with Uncertainty about Manufacturers￿Cost
In this appendix, we show that symmetry beliefs naturally arise in the separating equilibrium
of a Hotelling model of di⁄erentiated products in which manufacturers are privately informed
about their common cost of production. Moreover, as in our model with complete information
about manufacturers￿cost, manufacturers choose vertical separation in equilibrium.
There is a unit mass of consumers uniformly distributed over [0;1]. Two vertical structures
produce a homogeneous good and are located at the extremes of the interval; speci￿cally, retailer
R1 is located at 0 and retailer R2 is located at 1. Each consumer has a valuation v for a single
unit of the good. For simplicity, we assume v ! +1, so that each consumers always buys one
unit, regardless of the price. The transportation cost paid by a consumer located at x 2 [0;1]
who buys from R1 (resp. R2) is tx2 (resp. t(1 ￿ x)
2).
Manufacturers have a constant marginal cost of production c distributed on (￿1;+1) ￿
i.e., the cost has ￿full support.￿ 21 The marginal cost is private information to manufacturers.
Manufacturers o⁄er a two-part tari⁄ contract to retailers: Mi charges Ri a wholesale price
wi 2 R+ and a ￿xed fee Ti 2 R. Ri chooses the retail price pi 2 R+, i = 1;2.
Given prices p1 and p2, a consumer located at x buys from R1 if and only if
p1 + tx2 < p2 + t(1 ￿ x)
2 :
Therefore, in an interior solution, the demand for the good sold by Ri is
pj ￿ pi + t
2t
; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Consider a symmetric separating equilibrium in which manufacturers o⁄ers a wholesale price
de￿ned by the function w￿ (c). De￿ne the set of wholesale prices that a manufacturer can o⁄er
in equilibrium by
￿ = fw : 9c 2 (￿1;+1) such that w￿ (c) = wg:
Because retailers￿beliefs must be consistent with manufacturers￿strategies in equilibrium, when
Ri is o⁄ered a wholesale price wi 2 ￿, he expects that Rj is o⁄ered the same wholesale price wi.
Therefore, as in a standard Hotelling model with two ￿rms having marginal cost wi, Ri
chooses the retail price b pi = wi + t in equilibrium (and retailers￿markup does not depend on
wholesale prices). Hence, retailers￿expected pro￿t is t
2 and Mi charges a franchisee fee T￿ = t
2.




T￿ + (wi ￿ c)
￿











This is the standard problem of two Hotelling ￿rms with marginal cost c that choose prices wi
and wj. The solution to this problem is w￿ (c) = c+t: the equilibrium wholesale price is higher
than marginal cost. It follows that ￿ = (￿1;+1) ￿ i.e., every wholesale price can be o⁄ered
in equilibrium by manufacturers. Therefore, retailers have symmetry beliefs in the symmetric
separating equilibrium of the model. Finally, the equilibrium retail price is p￿ (c) = c + 2t and
manufacturers￿pro￿t is t.
21A negative marginal cost can be interpreted as a subsidy to the manufacturer by the government.
30We now consider the choice of organizational structure by manufacturers. First, when the
two vertical structures are integrated, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium retail
price is c + t and manufacturers￿pro￿t is t
2. Hence, both the retail price and manufacturers￿
pro￿t are lower than with two separated vertical structures.
Second, suppose there are two asymmetric vertical structures: Mi sells directly to ￿nal
consumers, while Mj sells through Rj. Consider a separating equilibrium in which Mj o⁄ers a
wholesale price w(c). De￿ne the set of wholesale prices that Mj can o⁄er in equilibrium by
￿a = fw : 9c 2 (￿1;+1) such that w(c) = wg:
Because Rj￿ s beliefs must be consistent with Mj￿ s strategy in equilibrium, when Rj is o⁄ered a
wholesale price wj 2 ￿, he believes Mi￿ s marginal cost to be w￿1 (wj).
Let pi (c) be the retail prices charged by Mi in equilibrium, and pj (wj) be the retail prices
charged by Rj in equilibrium, given the wholesale price wj. When he is o⁄ered the wholesale








￿ pj + t
2t
;
and expects Mi to choose the retail price to solve
max
pi
(pi ￿ w￿1 (wj))
pj (wj) ￿ pi + t
2t
:
The solution of these problems yields





























Tj (wj) + (wj ￿ c)




where, in order to satisfy Rj￿ s participation constraint,





￿ pj (wj) + t
2t
:
The (necessary and su¢ cient) ￿rst-order condition of this problem is








pi (c) ￿ pj (wj) + t
2t
+

































Therefore, equilibrium retail prices are pi (c) = c + 8
7t and pj (w(c)) = c + 9
7t, and manu-
facturers￿pro￿ts are ￿i = 32
49t and ￿j = 27
49t. Hence, with asymmetric vertical structures, retail
prices and manufacturers￿pro￿ts are lower than with separated vertical structures.




















By inspection, separation is a strictly dominant strategy for each manufacturer. As in our main
model, vertical separation allow manufacturers to sell at higher retail price and obtain higher
pro￿t.
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